A SCUD missile launcher at RAF Spadeadam

A SCUD missile launcher at RAF Spadeadam

Long-range defence

The increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles is one of the greatest threats to world peace. Richard Alcock talks to Codex about the UK's cooperative role, the technologies involved and how the Missile Defence Centre keeps government informed and up to date on potential threats and developments.

MOD UK Missile Defence Centre (MDC) Head, Richard Alcock gathers together stakeholders in the conference room that is the heart of the MDC, to inform them of their work and its implications to UK defence. The backdrop of missile trajectories and an illustration of types of missiles and their respective owners hints at the high-powered discussions held there.

The Centre was established in 2003 following signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and US for the conduct of collaborative ballistic defence studies. By establishing a joint industry and MOD centre the UK government believed it would best be able to meet the UK's long-term policy and research requirements.

"Our main focus is with the United States," explains Alcock. "They are rolling out a global ballistic defence system and currently have two live interceptor sites within the US along with a comprehensive radar and control network. They are also developing 'at sea' sensors and shooters and looking at fairly novel solutions as well."

Tom Clarke, Systems Engineer; Gui Johnston, Programme Manager; Richard Alcock, Head UK Missile Defence Centre; Mary Beth Corcoran, SIRAN Programme Leader

Tom Clarke, Systems Engineer; Gui Johnston, Programme Manager; Richard Alcock, Head UK Missile Defence Centre; Mary Beth Corcoran, SIRAN Programme Leader

He believes that the US is focused on being able to defeat any ballistic missile, from anywhere at any time, using a suite of defensive radars and interceptors. It is this drive which explains their major international outreach programme and current UK involvement. By establishing US missile defence assets in Europe the US are extending defensive coverage to all European NATO allies from a possible Middle Eastern ballistic attack.

Alcock is aware of the political sensitivity of the US plans but is keen to dispel any implication that there is a current threat of a ballistic missile attack to the UK: "The rationale for their programme is quite simple. The US sees a proliferating threat and a situation where an active defence could be necessary in the future. They are keen to ensure that they're prepared for that eventuality."

Missile Defence is an important security issue for NATO and in April 2008 at their Bucharest Summit, NATO ministers recognized that ballistic missile proliferation is an increasing threat to Allies and that missile defence could form part of a broad response to this threat.

The Summit agreed to explore ways to link the US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability with NATO's wider missile defence efforts which the UK and the MDC actively contribute to.

The SCHiLTron Wargame being executed at BAE's APEX facilities © BAE Systems

The SCHiLTron Wargame being executed at BAE's APEX facilities © BAE Systems

Alcock emphasises that although the NATO Bucharest Declaration encourages all nations including the UK to investigate the options for its own territorial defence, it is mainly concerned with defending NATO territories: "We are heavily committed to working with NATO looking at various options."

The UK is already participating with the US system through RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill in Yorkshire. Alcock explains that these are integral parts of the US defence system detecting threats that could possibly reach Europe and the US.

"We are already embedded with the US and although we [the UK] do not have a current requirement for active missile defence, there is an acknowledgement that ballistic missiles are proliferating.

"Despite our best efforts, proliferation continues and nations throughout the world are developing quite advanced capabilities which could potentially be marketed further. This is something that could affect future deployed operations for our troops."

A Trident II D5 Missile breaking the surface, having been fired from a Strategic Missile Submarine

A Trident II D5 Missile breaking the surface, having been fired from a Strategic Missile Submarine

And this is the main raison d'etre of the MDC; keeping abreast of threats and understanding the options that are available to defend this nation and its allies. Alcock and his colleagues have the knowledge and work hard to make sure that Ministers and other stakeholders are fully up to date with US policies and systems.

Apart from their role in informing and understanding, MDC also champions UK capabilities and explores the opportunities for UK technology: "We do a lot of work in terms of understanding US missile defence architecture and promoting UK capabilities within that area." The US, he believes, values their work as they bring a different perspective and a 'novel approach' to the table. Although there are national sensitivities he is pleased that they can exchange information on technology areas where there are benefits for both countries.

"We've played a key role in helping the US define the architecture for European deployment. We've conducted extensive systems analysis work to understand how the US system performs and we've highlighted where improvements could be made and how UK technology could make the system more robust."

This working relationship is enhanced by an exchange programme which gives personnel from both countries the opportunity to work with partners. SIRAN Programme Leader, Mary Beth Corcoran recently joined the MDC team and is getting to grips with different ways of working.

ZB launch © Missile Defence Centre

ZB launch © Missile Defence Centre

"There is a fascinating partnership in this country between industry and government. Coming from a large organisation it is interesting to be part of a small dynamic team," states Corcoran.

Industry is also represented with Gui Johnston from BAE Systems who is embedded within the team as Programme Manager to ensure planned activities meet cost and performance targets, and to help manage UK industrial interests in MDC. BAE hold the 'Lead Contract' for the UK MDC, helping MOD to place tasks with a range of industrial partners, including MBDA, QinetiQ, L3 Communications ASA and Lockheed Martin Insys Ltd.

Johnston explains: "The model makes it possible to harness experience and capabilities from a wide range of government and industrial organisations in order to meet the two MDC objectives which are to advise on policy and develop UK industrial opportunities."

Alcock is proud of the MDC's reputation and that other nations seek their views. He concludes: "It is important to maintain an impartial approach, especially when informing Ministers and dealing with national security."

RAF Fylingdales

The primary role of RAF Fylingdales, North Yorkshire, is to provide an uninterrupted ballistic missile warning service to both the UK and US governments (through the UK Missile Warning Centre at RAF High Wycombe and the Missile and Space Domain, in the Cheyenne Mountains in Colorado).

RAF Fylingdales © CSL Ltd

RAF Fylingdales © CSL Ltd

Secondary roles are to support the US Missile Defense Agency, to contribute to the Allied Space Surveillance Network, and to support UK forces worldwide through the Satellite Warning Service.

From 1963 to the 1990s the Fylingdales site was dominated by three 'golf balls' which housed mechanical tracking radars. In the early 1990s, these were replaced by a much more capable Solid State Phased Array Radar (SSPAR) which has no moving parts. SSPAR was further upgraded in 2007 and consists of a 3-sided truncated pyramid about 120 feet (40m) high. Each face contains an array of 2,560 transmit/receive modules and provides an overall mean power output from the three faces of approximately 2.5 megawatts.

Fylingdales is the only three-faced Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radar in the world, providing a full 360ยบ of cover. The SSPAR can keep track of many hundreds of space objects per minute out to a range of 3,000 nautical miles. The radar software is designed to ignore targets that do not behave like a rocket being launched or a satellite in orbit. It is little surprise, therefore, that RAF Fylingdales has never knowingly detected a UFO!

www.raf.mod.uk/raffylingdales/

Hypervelocity Impact Trial

Early in 2008 the MDC achieved a major 'first' with a full scale counter-fire (double dynamic) impact between a target and analogous kill vehicle in free flight. This gave the opportunity to prove and collect 'debris' for analysis and provided important new information on flight trials and intercepts.

RAF Menwith Hill

RAF Menwith Hill is located on moorland, west of Harrogate in North Yorkshire. The base is owned by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and MOD retains control over its use and its facilities, though the administration of the base is the responsibility of the US authorities.

It functions primarily as a field station of the National Security Agency (NSA) and its primary mission is to provide intelligence support for UK, US and allied interests. UK personnel from the MOD and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are fully integrated at all levels within both the operational and administrative areas of the base.

On 25 July 2007, the UK agreed to a US request to use satellite communications facilities at RAF Menwith Hill to route data to the US missile defence system. This is in addition to its use in the existing US-UK missile warning mission.

www.raf.mod.uk/organisation/rafmenwithhill.cfm

Ballistic missiles

Long-range ballistic missiles are technologically complex weapons systems that have a short period of powered flight when they are launched towards their destination and then continue on an unpowered, ballistic trajectory, arching back down to reach their target on earth.

The three phases of flight for a ballistic missile are boost, mid-course and terminal. Longer-range missiles are designed to travel through space during mid-course, thereby spending a smaller part of their flight in the atmosphere. At these ranges, only the re-entry vehicle (the tip of the missile carrying the warhead) continues to the target.

The technologies to develop a re-entry vehicle are complex, both to control the vehicle's behaviour and to cope with the heating effect when it re-enters the atmosphere.

The ability to deliver a ballistic missile on target is also a major technological challenge. Current ballistic missile threats are inaccurate as they are normally unguided once boost is complete and an accuracy of about 1km at a range of about 1,250km would be typical of an unguided vehicle.

As technology proliferates and developments continue, accuracy and threat will increase. For example, the UK's Trident missile has a range of over 4,000 nautical miles and an accuracy which can be measured in metres.

Ballistic missiles can carry biological, chemical, nuclear or high explosive warheads, the nature of which is unlikely to be known by the defender prior to the missile landing or being intercepted.

SIRAN

A new initiative, the Sensor Integration Research and Analysis Network is designed to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of UK, US and NATO missile defence systems.

The initial network includes the Multi-Object Tracking Radar (MOTR) at the Aberporth test range in Wales and connection into the Fylingdales Upgraded Early Warning Radar.

SIRAN will be used to investigate areas of missile defence through trials and demonstrations, using BMD sensors and mock or simulated targets to investigate options for developing and improving missile defence system

Excerpt from the Bucharest Summit Declaration April 2008

Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. We are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture.

Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.

We also commend the work already under way to strengthen NATO-Russia missile defence cooperation. We are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence-building measures to allay any concerns. We encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and we are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.

SCHILTRON wargame

Understanding and developing technology is part of the challenge for the MDC. Another is how to prepare for any potential threat.

SCHILTRON (a schiltron is a medieval war fighting technique used by infantry to defend against cavalry attacks) is a high fidelity systems analysis wargame series that has been designed to explore issues such as debris collection that could arise in a real life situation.

It uses computer-driven scenarios to create a realistic environment and test the control and decision-making process. It is estimated that in the future there could be as little as six minutes to respond to a threat against Europe from the Middle East and with the possibility of multiple threats, it is essential that potential scenarios are anticipated and rehearsed.

SCHILTRON looks at issues from the political to the tactical. Using two teams, the 'threat' team and the 'blue' team, it allows each team to make the most of their capabilities.